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Abstract: How does branding militant groups as “foreign terrorist organizations” affect 
them? Beyond its obvious policy importance, this question speaks to debates about 
counterterrorism, terrorism financing, and organizational dynamics of subnational violence. 
This article analyzes Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation, a key policy used 
by the U.S. government since 1997 to impose costs on foreign terrorist groups and those 
who might support them. Contrary to arguments that sanctions are ineffective and that 
terrorism is too “cheap” to be affected, it is argued that designation should weaken terrorist 
groups, reducing their attacks over time. However, the effect is probably conditional. FTO 
designation should be especially effective against groups operating in U.S.-aligned 
countries, given the importance of international cooperation in counterterrorism. Global 
quantitative analyses suggest that FTOs operating in U.S.-aligned countries carry out fewer 
attacks over time than other groups, taking many other factors into consideration.  
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How does branding militant groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) affect 
them? The U.S. government has applied this status to dozens of groups, but we know little 
about the effects of this action. FTO designation is a controversial instrument of U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts (e.g., Foust, 2012; Kessler, 2014). Other countries and international 
organizations employ similar lists, but the U.S. FTO list is the longest-lasting and probably 
the most influential. The listing imposes costs on groups, most notably economic sanctions. 
U.S. counterterrorism sanctions have frozen tens of millions of dollars from designated 
groups (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2015), constrained their behavior by preventing 
further legal financial transactions, and led to the arrest of individuals providing material 
support to the organizations. FTO designation also provides a signal to the international 
community, which is a stigma that many groups seek to avoid. However, we do not know if 
these consequences translate into serious changes for terrorist organizations, such as a 
change in their violence output. 
Some observers claim that FTO status can be “very effective” at weakening militant 
groups (Rekhi 2002) or that it is an “effective legal tool to impede terrorist organizations” 
(Schwartz 2014). The State Department asserts that the list plays a “critical role” in 
counterterrorism.1 However, others are skeptical. FTO designation “doesn’t matter much,” 
according to some analysts (Van Linschoten, Strick, and Kuehn 2012), and an anonymous 
White House official described FTO status as “largely symbolic” (DeYoung 2012). Writing 
about the broader approach the FTO list is part of, Neumann (2017a) argues that “the war 
on terrorist financing has failed.” He suggests that states “waste time and money” trying to 
block funding to terrorist groups. Nevertheless, he acknowledges there is not enough 
research on the subject to know for sure (Neumann 2017b). 
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 FTO designation speaks to a number of debates in the literature. Scholars 
increasingly use terrorist organizations as the unit of analysis to understand terrorism and 
other violence (Asal, Schulzke, and Pate 2017; Jordan, 2014). Terrorist groups, like licit 
groups, face challenges connected to recruiting and bureaucratic organization (Crenshaw 
1987). Research across multiple disciplines seeks to understand dynamics of terrorist group 
financing (Bantekis, 2003; Clarke 2015; Horgan and Taylor, 1999). Research on economic 
sanctions against states questions their effectiveness (Drezner, 1999).2 Some studies 
evaluate government tactics against militant groups, such as leadership removal (e.g., 
Johnston, 2012), but there is less analysis of other types of policies, and no systematic 
analysis of the effects of U.S. FTO designation on violence. 
 This article presents an argument that FTO designation can be associated with 
weakening terrorist organizations, but only for those groups that primarily operate in 
countries cooperating with the United States on security issues. This is because 
international partners are crucial to monitoring financing of local groups, enforcing 
sanctions, and assisting with direct action against groups (e.g., arrests) given U.S. 
intelligence. The argument and findings go against several common assumptions, such as 
the notion that terrorism is too “cheap” to depend on money, or that sanctions simply do not 
work. The findings also highlight the importance of international cooperation in 
counterterrorism efforts.  
 The next section discusses the FTO list, including designation criteria. It then 
discusses three important elements of the argument: that terrorist groups depend on money, 
sanctions can substantially affect terrorist group financing, and the effects of U.S. sanctions 
should be especially powerful against groups in U.S.-allied countries. The empirical section 
analyzes a sample of hundreds of terrorist groups. FTO status is associated with decreases 
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in terrorist attacks over time, conditional upon the group operating in a country that is 
aligned with the United States. The conclusion presents suggestions for related research. 
          
Terrorist group designation and its consequences 
In 1997, the United States government created the Foreign Terrorist Organization 
list, initially designating 28 groups, such as Hezbollah, the PKK, and Colombia’s National 
Liberation Army (Cronin, 2003). Other groups were added in subsequent years, including 
al Qaeda (1999), the Real Irish Republican Army (2001), and al Qaeda in Iraq (2004), 
which evolved into the Islamic State or ISIS.3 Designation indicates that financial 
institutions should seize all funds associated with the group and report them to the 
Department of the Treasury, and that the Department of Justice should prosecute U.S. 
citizens providing material support to the group. Additionally, members of the group can be 
expelled from or refused entry to the United States.  
FTO status also has international implications. After the establishment of the U.S. 
FTO list, other states and institutions started their own similar lists. Scholars who analyzed 
six such lists describe the Unites States as a “trendsetter,” exerting substantial influence on 
other countries’ lists (Ilbiz and Curtis 2015). There is overlap across lists regarding which 
groups are included, although the U.S. list is more global, while other countries’ lists are 
more regional (Freedman 2010).4   
Another international implication of the FTO list is that other states can cite the 
designation to attempt to gain increased legitimacy for their counterterrorism actions. When 
Kashmiri group Hizbul Mujahideen was recently listed, for example, the Indian press 
claimed this was “an endorsement of India’s narrative on Kashmir” (Roy Chaudhury 2017). 
India’s ministry of foreign affairs commended the FTO designation in a press conference, 
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and used the opportunity to describe the “terrorist activities” of the group – probably to the 
dismay of Pakistan, which opposed the designation (Al Jazeera 2017). In the Philippines in 
2002, when the United States designated the New People’s Army, local analysts argued that 
this would encourage their government to intensify its controversial counterinsurgency 
tactics (Conde 2002). When another Philippine group was designated an FTO, a Philippine 
government spokesperson claimed that this reaffirmed the government’s ideas about the 
group, and that the designation recognized the government’s “decisive action” thus far 
(Argullas 2018).  
Groups must fit three criteria to be considered for designation. They need to be 
foreign to the United States, use terrorism,5 and threaten the security of U.S. nationals or 
national security of the United States. National security includes “national defense, foreign 
relations, or economic interests.”6 While these criteria seem straightforward, the actual 
process to designate a group is complex, and involves numerous branches of the federal 
government – with multiple actors able to veto the potential designation. As a result, it is 
not the case that every foreign terrorist group that presents some threat to U.S. citizens or 
the country is on the list (Young, 2012).  
There are diplomatic, bureaucratic, and domestic political considerations involved 
in the designation process.7 The FTO list is created and maintained by the State 
Department, but other U.S. government actors are involved.8 After State’s Bureau of 
Counterterrorism identifies a potential designee, the Departments of Treasury and Justice 
are consulted, as well as geographic bureaus within State. Any of these actors can prevent a 
group from being designated. During this phase, various other actors provide input on the 
potential designee: the intelligence community, the National Security Council, the 
Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Government 
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Accountability Office, 2015: 21). Eventually, Congress is notified, and if there is no 
Congressional objection, the group enters the list.  
The 2014 designation of Boko Haram is an example of the complex path to 
designation (Kessler, 2014). Members of Congress suggested considering FTO designation 
for the group in 2011, but the Nigerian government – and regional experts within the State 
Department – argued that designation could disrupt aid flows. There was also concern that 
designation could give the group desired international attention. The group was finally 
designated at the end of 2013. Other groups have entered the list much more quickly. 
However, the Boko Haram example illustrates the notion that designation often seems 
consistent with Allison’s (1971) organizational process or government politics models of 
decision-making. It is not necessarily “national security,” from a unitary actor standpoint, 
that alone determines which groups are on the list.  
The Taliban is another complicated case. Despite technically meeting the criteria, 
the group never completed the designation process. Like the Boko Haram situation, the 
Afghan government and elements of the U.S. government were opposed, in this case 
because of the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban (e.g., Foust 2012). If the group 
were designated, such negotiations could be more complicated, if not illegal. Overall, these 
examples demonstrate that designation is a complicated process, leading to a diverse set of 
organizations on the list. One study found that groups that have attacked aviation targets, or 
have Islamist ideology, are especially likely to be designated FTOs (Beck and Miner 2013).  
Once designated, groups remain on the FTO list until their status is revoked. Every 
five years, groups are reviewed to see if the circumstances regarding their listing – 
particularly their capability and intentions – have changed.9 At this point, de-listing could 
occur. Alternately, the Secretary of State and Congress have the authority to revoke FTO 
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status at any time (Cronin 2003). Of the 46 groups designated in the years examined in this 
study, most (33) are still FTOs today. As with the initial designation, political and 
bureaucratic disagreements can affect status revocation. For example, a great deal of 
lobbying and debate went into the eventual revocation Mujahedin-e-Khalq’s FTO status.10  
The U.S. government expends considerable resources on FTO designation and 
related enforcement because it is expected to put pressure on designated terrorist groups. Is 
that goal being achieved? How does FTO designation affect terrorism? The following 
sections presents a three-part argument, explaining how (1) terrorist groups depend on 
funding, and how (2) sanctions can affect funding, reducing groups’ ability to attack. 
However, the effects are conditional on the country in which the group operates. (3) 
Harmful effects of designation are especially strong in countries aligned with the United 
States on counterterrorism, because cooperation is essential for designation to have 
meaningful consequences. 
 
Terrorist groups depend on funding 
 Terrorist groups are sometimes thought of as poor, weak actors who scrape together 
a little cash to build cheap bombs. Terrorism is less expensive than conventional warfare, 
and terrorists are often relatively weak compared to their state adversaries (Crenshaw 
1981), but terrorism still requires substantial resources. Levitt (2006: 52) discusses the 
extent to which Hamas depends on financial incentives for members. Beyond the direct 
material costs of an attack, which can be thousands of dollars, there are longer-term 
expenses such as monthly payments to the family of the “martyr.” Such payments make it 
difficult to calculate the precise cost of attacks, but these incentives allow Hamas to keep its 
steady supply of recruits, and remain a prominent terrorist organization.  
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 Hamas stands out for its vast budget, but other groups also depend on funds to 
maintain their operational pace. Shapiro’s (2013) in-depth research shows that terrorist 
organizations regularly pay their operatives, as a strategy to overcome the challenges of 
organizing terror (e.g., ibid: 108). Many of the groups he analyzes had internal 
disagreements about money, with examples coming from small leftist groups in Europe to 
the Mau Mau in Kenya (ibid: 73-74). Additionally, the tactic of paying families of 
“martyrs” is not exclusive to Islamist groups. The Irish Republican Army, for example, 
financially supported families of group members in prison (Horgan and Taylor, 1999). 
Terrorist groups of virtually every ideological goal and size depend on monetary resources. 
A substantial body of policy-oriented literature, as well as news reports, provides 
examples of the extent to which terrorist groups rely on money (e.g., Clarke, 2015; Jorisch, 
2009). The United Self-Defense Forces Colombia (AUC), designated an FTO in 2001, 
extorted at least $1.7 million from Chiquita Brands International between 1997 and 2004 
(Jorisch, 2009: 14-15). A network of hawalas in Somalia apparently funneled millions of 
dollars to al Qaeda, also an FTO, in the early 2000s (ibid: 74-75). When al Qaeda wanted to 
fund an attack in Turkey, it sent $100,000 in cash to operatives there. The resulting truck 
bombing, in Istanbul in 2003, killed 58 people (Vick, 2007). 
 Terrorist group funding is critical for terrorist attacks, and attacks are crucial for 
group survival. “The terrorists’ ability to attract – and moreover, to continue to attract – 
attention is most often predicated on the success of their attacks,” argues Bruce Hoffman 
(2006: 248-249). Individual attacks can cost thousands of dollars, and organizations need 
funds beyond that amount to keep members loyal, to continue training, and to maintain 
operational security, among other expenses. Some groups spend a considerable amount of 
their funds on social services. This allows them to have especially loyal recruits and 
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supporters, which ultimately helps the group to attack more and more lethally than other 
groups (Berman, 2009). 
 Attacks are central to terrorist groups’ existence, but, attack rates vary considerably 
between groups and over time.11 Terrorist group attack rates decrease either voluntarily or 
involuntarily: the group might voluntarily decrease its violence as it regroups after resource 
depletion or other generally internal reasons, or it might be unable to maintain its previous 
attack rate because of imposed pressure such as successful counterterrorism (Becker, 2017). 
Constraints on a group’s funding seem likely to lead to fewer attacks through both 
mechanisms. 
 
FTO status is likely to affect groups and their violence 
Given that terrorist groups depend on money, which makes attacks possible, can 
designation significantly affect terrorist groups? Substantial evidence suggests the 
affirmative. The U.S. Department of the Treasury reports that it has blocked almost $22 
million in funds from sanctioned terrorists, as of the end of 2014 (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2015). Sanctioned terrorists include FTOs and their members, as well as 
individuals and groups named in Executive Orders, which generally overlap with the FTO 
list.12 Aside from the direct effects on groups of more than $20 million in lost funds, the 
sanctions also affect organizations through making other actors afraid of doing business 
with the group. This forces organizations to become more secretive with their funding 
(which is costly in itself), and forces them to engage in riskier or potentially alienating 
fundraising activities such as the drug trade. Sanctions can affect groups based outside the 
United States because high-level members of groups often want U.S. bank accounts, and 
many groups have donors in the United States.  
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Beyond financial effects, sanctions also have immigration status effects, forcing 
members out of the United States and barring their entry. Between 2009 and 2013, the 
United States denied 1,069 people non-immigrant visas, and 187 applicant immigrant visas, 
based on terrorist activity or affiliation with a designated FTO (Government Accountability 
Office 2015, 15-16). Additional individuals are stopped at ports of entry by U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection and denied admission to the United States because of an FTO 
affiliation (ibid., 16). This can hinder operational planning, fundraising, political outreach, 
and other group goals. For example, if a group is planning to attack inside the United 
States, the operation becomes more difficult if the group is not able to have members 
legally in the country. Many militant groups have or try to have operatives in the United 
States for fundraising from diaspora communities, or to lobby allies or potential allies in 
Washington.13 All of this becomes more challenging when group members are barred from 
the country. Overall, members of designated FTOs try to enter the United States, but are 
prevented from doing so – which is likely to affect a broad range of group activities.   
Once sanctions begin against a group, not only are its current funds off-limits, but 
other actors might become hesitant about doing business with the group. This includes 
individual donors, banks, and charities that might funnel money to the group. The idea of 
“material support” goes beyond direct financial contributions. For example, a New York 
man who operated a satellite television business was providing customers access to a 
Hezbollah-controlled television channel. He was charged with providing material support 
to the FTO and was sentenced to more than five years in prison (Weiser, 2009). This 
probably discouraged other individuals from doing business with Hezbollah.    
The “chilling effect” of FTO designation and related sanctions has led banks to 
change policies and increase their scrutiny of customers, making it harder for terrorists to 
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use formal financial structures to hold or move money. Beyond banks, another example of 
changed behavior is that of Chiquita Brands International, which eventually stopped giving 
extortion money to the FTO-designated AUC, probably at least in part because of the court 
case which resulted in $25 million in fines against the company by the U.S. government 
(Jorisch, 2009: 14-15). 
The FTOs themselves also update their behavior as a response to sanctions. Changes 
include increased activity outside of formal financial institutions, including simply carrying 
large amounts of cash, and increasingly creative money laundering (Gilmore, 2011: 145-
149). However, these measures are not risk-free themselves. Governments sanction hawala 
systems, and cash bundles are frequently intercepted (Moran, 2014).  
Sanctions can also pressure groups to move from funding via donations to more 
politically risky tactics such as the drug trade, kidnapping, and extortion. As political 
actors, some terrorist groups try to maintain a relative moral high ground, and often avoid 
such tactics (Freeman 2011, 468). In recent years, though, terrorist groups increasingly use 
kidnappings solely to raise funds. Some analysts attribute increased kidnapping to efforts 
against terrorism financing (Center for Security Studies, 2013: 2). The apparent shift in 
behavior of some groups targeted by sanctions suggests that the sanctions do have 
meaningful consequences. 
This evidence suggests that terrorists can be affected by sanctions. Groups are likely 
to have less funds to work with, actors who might interact with them in the future are 
discouraged, and the groups are forced to resort to riskier financing tactics. This suggests 
overall weaker terrorist groups, organizations less able to carry out attacks. However, 
sanctions do not seem to affect all terrorist groups equally.  
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The conditioning effect of U.S. allies 
While it seems possible that designation and the resulting sanctions could reduce 
groups’ ability to carry out attacks, it is also likely that this impact depends on the context 
in which the group operates. Groups operating in U.S.-aligned countries are more likely to 
be affected by U.S. sanctions than groups operating in other countries. Allies are important 
for terrorist group sanctions for a number of reasons. For U.S. sanctions to be effective at 
confronting foreign terrorist groups, partners are needed to share intelligence on the groups, 
share information about financial flows, and assist with local arrests based on information 
from the United States. This cooperation is especially beneficial when it involves the 
country in which an FTO is based. The argument is not necessarily about allies in a formal 
sense, but any state that cooperates on counterterrorism. It has been shown that cooperation 
among terrorist groups can help those groups attacking states (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; 
Moghadam, 2017), so it seems likely that the obverse side is also true: international 
cooperation should help states confront terrorist groups.    
There are important reasons states might not cooperate on counterterrorism (Enders 
and Sandler, 2012: 170-200). For example, there are collective action problems, ideological 
differences, and the fact that groups threaten different states to different degrees. States do 
not always agree on which groups are “terrorist groups.” Cooperating with a sometimes-
unpopular country like the United States can provoke local grievances (e.g., Rosendorff and 
Sandler 2004). However, these issues are often overcome, through shared ideology, 
common threats, financial compensation, and other mechanisms, and states do indeed 
cooperate on counterterrorism.14 This can lead to substantial consequences. For example, 
Spanish counterterrorism benefitted from US cooperation in the fight against ETA. In 
addition to putting pressure on the group via economic sanctions, the United States offered 
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to gather information on the communications of ETA members using the capabilities of the 
National Security Agency (Tremlett, 2001). U.S. cooperation is argued to have contributed 
substantially to the increase in arrests of ETA members in Spain and abroad in the early 
2000s (Ramos, 2005: 127-129).15  
Two Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines and Indonesia, provide interesting 
points of comparison regarding how international cooperation can affect FTOs. The 
Philippines, a long-term military ally of the United States, has been especially effective at 
disrupting terrorist financing and plots.16 The Philippines is home to a variety of terrorist 
organizations, including the FTO Abu Sayyaf. This country is more likely to discourage the 
funding of FTOs, more likely to share information about funding with the United States, 
and as a result should be overall especially effective in weakening the FTOs in its territory. 
Neighboring Indonesia appears to have had a different level of commitment to 
counterterrorism, at least until recent years. Much of this difference is due to skepticism in 
the Indonesian public for U.S.-led counterterrorism. The consequence has been years of 
lukewarm counterterrorism. For example, the US government designated Indonesian group 
Jemaah Islamiyah as an FTO in 2002, but the Indonesian government resisted banning the 
group until 2008 (Forbes, 2008). Regarding prosecution of terror financing, Indonesia was 
for years labeled as non-cooperative or deficient by the Financial Action Task Force 
(Financial Action Task Force, 2014). This singling out is informally known as the 
“blacklist,” and Indonesia joined countries such as Algeria and Myanmar in the distinction, 
until its status was upgraded in 2015 (Financial Action Task Force, 2015). Indonesia 
increasingly cooperates with the United States on counterterrorism (e.g., U.S. Department 
of State, 2010), but apparently not to the same degree as other countries such as the 
Philippines, especially in the years immediately after 9/11.   
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Overall, some evidence suggests that FTO designation could reduce terrorist 
attacks, which is what proponents of the FTO list would assert.   
H1: Groups on the FTO list carry out fewer terrorist attacks over time, relative to 
groups not on the list. 
 
However, the conditional argument presented above implies that FTO status should 
only reduce the terrorism of organizations in certain kinds of countries. This idea, the main 
argument of this article, can be summarized as follows: 
H2: Groups on the FTO list and operating in states that cooperate with the United 
States on security issues carry out fewer terrorist attacks over time, relative to groups not 
on the list and not operating in U.S.-aligned countries. 
 
Empirical analysis 
Data and variables 
Analyses use data on hundreds of terrorist groups around the world, from 1970-
2006.17 These data are a combination of the Jones and Libicki (2008) terrorist group data 
and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) attack data. The Jones and Libicki data set is 
widely used in terrorism studies (e.g., Carter, 2012). It includes basically every group in the 
world who was reported to have carried out a terrorist attack, and for which additional 
information can be found. This rather broad understanding of “terrorist group,” any 
subnational group that uses terrorism (even if other analysts might think of some of the 
groups as guerrilla or insurgent organizations), is relevant for this study because it is 
consistent with many governments’ understanding of terrorist groups.18 Some of Jones and 
Libicki’s groups only have attacks for one year, which does not permit us to look at 
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changes over time, or to lag variables. As a result, the primary models reported here have 
390 terrorist groups, but others have more or less, depending on the sample used. The unit 
of analysis is terrorist group-year. Primary models have 4,469 group-year observations. 
The dependent variable is Change in attacks, based on a count of GTD attacks 
associated with each group. The GTD is the most commonly used and comprehensive 
database of attacks available globally and for so many years, and most attacks are 
associated with a group via GTD’s gname variable. Since the dependent variable is a 
change or delta variable, it measures the difference between the number of attacks 
associated with the group during the year of analysis, and the number of the group’s attacks 
in the previous year. This measure varies considerably, but is normally distributed and 
ranges between -253 and 311 in the primary sample. Terrorist attacks are an important 
outcome of interest, widely studied as a key terrorist organizational output (e.g., Hoffman, 
2006: 248-249; Li, 2005; Piazza, 2008).19 Changes in attacks are not a key factor behind 
designation, or remaining on the list.20  
Beyond this measure, one robustness check includes the change of attacks in the 
group’s country that year. This is to deal with the issue that many attacks are not claimed 
by groups (Kearns, Conlon, and Young 2014). It also allows us to explore the possibility 
that counterterrorism activity against one group might affect other groups – as recent 
literature suggests (Tominaga 2018). Another robustness check, in the appendix, uses 
changes in groups’ fatalities instead of their attacks as the dependent variable. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
16 
 
 The key independent variable FTOt-1 is coded “1” in the years that the group is on 
the FTO list. Data come from the U.S. State Department, and the groups are shown in Table 
1. A total of 41 groups were on the list at some point between 1997 and 2006 and appear in 
the sample, although the number changed regularly. The fact that many of the groups were 
listed en masse in 1997 adds some exogeneity to the timing of designation. In general, it 
does not appear that groups were added when they were especially strong or weak. A one-
year lag is used to take into consideration that some time might be necessary for sanctions 
to have their effects. 
An alternate measure of FTO status is also tested, a count variable of years on the 
FTO list instead of the dichotomous measure. This variable is used because if the argument 
is correct, it seems likely that additional years of FTO status will be associated with 
reduced terrorism – but only or primarily for groups in U.S.-aligned countries. This variable 
ranges from 0 to 10. See Table 1 for more information.   
 Another key independent variable measures alignment with the United States on 
security issues. There is no ideal measure of a country’s propensity to cooperate with the 
United States on counterterrorism issues in particular. The first and primary measure is U.S. 
ally, coded 1 for groups operating in a country that is in a formal military alliance with the 
United States.21 Scholars have long used alliance membership to proxy similar foreign 
policy or security interests (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 1975). About half the groups in the 
sample are coded as being in countries that are aligned with the United States by this 
measure. Alliance data come from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) 
project (Leeds et al., 2002).22 ATOP only codes alliances through 2003, but I extended the 
data through 2006 with information from the director of ATOP. This is a widely-cited 
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alliance database, coding hundreds of military alliances around the world based on clear 
and consistent criteria.  
About half the groups in the sample are coded as being in countries that are aligned 
with the United States by this measure. Interestingly, U.S. ally and FTOt-1 are virtually 
uncorrelated. Alliances are an imperfect measure of security cooperation because alliances 
do not always match up perfectly with actual counterterrorism partners (Byman 2006). 
Joint alliance membership nonetheless indicates security cooperation, and this measure is 
consistently measured across time and space, which offers advantages over other measures.  
 Two alternate measures of security cooperation are used. First, Model 5 uses U.S. 
alliance portfolio similarity, Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) weighted S-score, made 
available by Häge (2011). This measure considers the overlap between two states’ portfolio 
of military alliances.23 It has been used in other studies as an indicator of potential 
counterterrorism cooperation (Bapat, 2007). Since closeness to the United States is of 
interest, the measure is the closeness to the U.S. alliance portfolio for the state in which 
each terrorist group primarily operates. The variable is only available through 2000, but it 
does not change much over time, so I extend the 2000 values through 2006.24 A second 
alternative is a dichotomous variable indicating the presence of an FBI office in the 
country, which Efrat (2015) argues is an important indicator of counterterrorism 
cooperation. By 2006, 56 countries had such an office. This variable only has information 
from 1993 onward, so the sample is smaller than others. However, the FBI has been crucial 
in U.S. international counterterrorism efforts, so this is an important alternate measure.  
 Regarding control variables, the group fixed effects in most models prohibit the use 
of variables that do not vary over time. Models include both terrorist organization control 
variables, and state-level controls. Regarding organizational controls, models include 
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Attackst-1, a measure of the GTD attacks associated with the group in the previous year. 
This is to provide a baseline of the group’s activity. Group age is the number of years the 
group has existed, usually according to Jones and Libicki. Age squared is also included 
because it is likely that there is a non-linear relationship between age and changes in attacks 
(Asal and Rethemeyer 2008).  
 Models also include a measure of “decapitations” the group has suffered, when a 
high-ranking leader was killed or captured. Decapitation can reduce the violence of terrorist 
organizations (Price, 2012; Johnston, 2012). It is also included to take into consideration to 
what extent the group has been targeted by the state, as there is substantial variation among 
groups in this regard. The measure comes from Price (2012). It is lagged one year because 
there might be a delay between decapitation and potential effects on attack output. 
Several other group-level variables are only included in the non-fixed-effects 
models because they do not vary over time and therefore are too correlated with the group 
fixed effects. UCDP rebel group is coded 1 for groups that are listed in the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program Actor Dataset (UCDP, 2015). This variable is included because the 
notion of “terrorist group” is broad, and some groups, such as those that have been in civil 
conflict, might be thought of as a different subcategory of actor. Group size is an ordinal 
measure approximating the peak membership of the group, where 0 means fewer than 99 
members, 1 is 100 to 999 members, 2 indicates 1,000-9,999 members, and 3 indicates 
groups with 10,000 or more. This is a rough approximation, but the best that is currently 
available for the hundreds of terrorist groups around the world. The source is the Jones and 
Libicki data. Larger groups should carry out more attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008).  
Religious is a variable coded “1” for groups primarily motivated by a religion, as 
opposed to leftist or rightist ideology, or other goals. Religious groups are often more 
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violent that other types of terrorist organizations (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008). The source 
is the Jones and Libicki data. Holds territory is coded “1” for groups exercising control 
over a substantial piece of territory for a sustained period. Sources consulted include Lexis 
Nexis searches and the Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) data for some years. State sponsored is 
coded “1” for groups receiving material support from a state, whether weapons, funds, or 
otherwise. This variable is coded using the same sources as those for the territory variable, 
and the RAND Terrorist Organization Profiles data, which has information on group 
funding. Holds territory and State sponsored are time invariant because there is not enough 
reliable information on temporal changes in these phenomena for clandestine groups.   
 Control variables are also included to take into consideration attributes of the 
country in which each group primarily operates. For most groups the state of primary 
operation was easy to classify, even though many groups carry out some transnational 
attacks. Some groups are more complicated, such as al Qaeda. It was coded as primarily 
operating in Afghanistan through 2001, and then in Pakistan in subsequent years. If al 
Qaeda is excluded, results hold.  
 Country regime type is the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) liberal democracy 
measure (Coppedge et al. 2016), where a higher score indicates a more democratic country. 
Some research suggests democratic countries experience more terrorism than other kinds of 
countries (Chenoweth 2010). It comes via the Quality of Government data (Teorell et al. 
2018). GDPPC is a measure of the gross domestic product per capita of the country, in 
thousands of constant dollars. This comes from the Penn World Tables, via Quality of 
Government. GDPPC could have a negative relationship with Change in attacks, as higher 
income per capita could indicate state capacity, and therefore counterterrorism capacity 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). Population (log) is a natural logarithm of the country’s 
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population that year. Larger countries tend to have more terrorism (Piazza, 2011), and as a 
result, perhaps groups in these countries should use more terrorism with time. This variable 
also comes from the Penn World Tables, via the Quality of Government project.  
 
Estimator 
 The models are ordinary least-squares regressions due to the normal distribution of 
the dependent variable. They include group fixed effects to take into consideration that 
groups are being observed repeatedly, and because there are group-level factors that we 
might not be able to measure. Hausman tests indicate that fixed effects are preferable to 
random effects. One disadvantage of fixed effects models is that they cannot include time 
invariant-variables. A model without fixed effects is shown in Table 3, and this model 
includes additional independent variables that do not change over time. A Wooldridge test 
suggests the presence of autocorrelation, so models include AR(1) disturbances (Baltagi 
and Wu 1999). Year fixed effects cannot be included with the AR(1) disturbances, but 
results are similar if year fixed effects are used instead. Alternate specifications are 
presented below or in the online Appendix.  
  
Results 
 The primary results are shown in Table 2. The first model includes only control 
variables as a baseline. Results for these variables are discussed below. Model 2 introduces 
the measure FTOt-1, and it is statistically significant and negatively signed, suggesting a 
group that was an FTO in the previous year is expected to see a decrease in attacks by the 
following year. The coefficient for the FTO variable suggest a group should carry out about 
7 fewer attacks than it did in the previous year if it is an FTO. This suggests support for 
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Hypothesis 1, but this is an unconditional result. Other models suggest a more complex 
relationship between FTO status and group attacks. Model 3 includes U.S. ally, the 
coefficient on the variable in Model 2 is statistically insignificant, suggesting that simply 
operating in a U.S.-allied state is not associated with a change in a group’s number of 
attacks each year.  
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
Model 4, the main model, includes the interaction term of FTOt-1 and U.S. ally. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant and negatively signed, 
suggesting that if a group was designated an FTO, and operates primarily in U.S.-allied 
state, it is expected to carry out fewer attacks in the year under observation than in the 
previous year. Figure 1 graphs the estimated marginal effect of FTO status on a group’s 
yearly change in attacks – conditional upon U.S. alliance status. FTOs that are not in U.S.-
allied states do not have a statistically significant change in attacks when compared to non-
FTOs. However, FTOs in U.S.-allied states are estimated to carry out around 16 fewer 
attacks from year to year, compared with non-FTOs. These results suggest support for 
Hypothesis 2.  
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
 In Model 4, FTOt-1 is statistically insignificant, but this should be interpreted as the 
effect of being on the FTO list in the previous year, conditional upon not being in an 
alliance with the United States. This component term result suggests that FTO status is not 
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associated with a change in terrorist attacks for those groups that do not primarily operate 
in U.S.-allied states. This is consistent with the results in Figure 1, and substantially 
qualifies support for Hypothesis 1. 
 Model 5 incorporates the alternate measure of security cooperation with the United 
States, U.S. alliance portfolio similarity. This is continuous measure of the same concept 
that U.S. ally is intended to proxy, security cooperation with the United States. The results 
are similar to those of U.S. ally. Since U.S. alliance portfolio similarity is continuous, it is 
helpful to graph the effects FTO status at different levels of alliance similarity.  
 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
 
 Figure 2 graphs the expected effect of FTOt-1 at different levels of the continuous 
measure U.S. alliance portfolio similarity. The diagonal line, representing the association 
between FTO status and changes in attacks, has a steep slope. This suggests that the effect 
of FTO designation on terrorist attacks depends markedly on to what extent the state in 
which they primarily operate cooperates with the United States on security issues. For 
FTOs in countries with quite distinct alliance portfolios from that of the United States, such 
as Lebanon or Libya, FTO status is associated with no change in attacks. (The far-left side 
of Figure 1 suggests an increase in attacks, but there are no FTO observations at this 
extreme end.) For FTOs that operate in states with alliance portfolios close to the United 
States, such as Colombia or Turkey, these groups are expected to see decreases of 
approximately 16 (Colombia) or 22 (Turkey) fewer attacks since the previous year, other 
factors held constant. To refer to two examples discussed earlier in the article, Indonesia in 
2000 had a weighted S-score of about .07, while the Philippines had a weighted S-score of 
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about .40. Figure 1 suggests that FTO status for groups in Indonesia is not associated with a 
change in their attacks. The line is statistically insignificant at that point. However, FTO 
status for groups in the more U.S.-aligned Philippines is associated with a reduction of 
about 12 attacks per year. Models 4 and 5 provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2.  
  Regarding control variables in Table 2, Attackst-1 is statistically significant and 
negative in all models, suggesting a higher level of attacks in the previous year is associated 
with a decrease between that year and the following. This suggests a return-to-the the mean 
phenomenon. It is important to control for such trends. Group age is statistically 
insignificant, but its squared term is marginally significant and negative in all models of 
Table 2. If the combined effect is calculated, increasing age is associated with decreased 
attacks, but only for unusually old groups (>30 years). A non-linear relationship between 
group age and attacks or lethality is consistent with other studies (Asal and Rethemeyer 
2008). The leadership removal variable is negatively signed as expected, but statistical 
significance is not robust. Additional group-level controls are shown in Table 3. 
 Regarding state-level variables, country regime type is statistically significant and 
positively signed in all models. Groups in more democratic countries carry out more attacks 
over time. This is consistent with some research on democracy and terrorism (e.g., 
Chenoweth 2010). Country population and per capita GDP are statically insignificant in 
most models. (If a GDP squared term is included, there is no evidence of a non-linear 
relationship.) These variables are statistically significant in Model 8, with the country 
dependent variable, suggesting country dynamics are important for explaining a country’s 
terrorism, consistent with the literature. For the group dependent variable, it makes sense 
that group factors seem to matter more. 
[Table 2 about here.] 
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Additional specifications and robustness checks 
Table 3 shows alternate specifications of Model 4, the primary interaction term 
model, to gauge the robustness of relationships in that model. (If Model 5 is used, with U.S. 
alliance portfolio similarity, results are similar.) Results for the interaction term relationship 
are consistent across all models in terms of the significance and direction of the 
relationship. Being on the FTO list and operating in a U.S.-aligned country is robustly 
associated with decreased terrorist attacks.  
Model 6 excludes group fixed effects to account for group-level heterogeneity in 
different ways and includes time-invariant variables. In both models, standard errors are 
clustered by terrorist group. Some time-invariant independent variables return interesting 
results. UCDP rebel group is statistically significant and positive, suggesting groups that 
have been in civil conflict carry out more attacks over time. Group size is also statistically 
significant and positive, consistent with expectations.25 Religious group is statistically 
insignificant. The relationship between religion and terrorism is debated, and probably 
conditional on other factors (Piazza, 2009), so the non-result is not necessarily surprising. If 
an “Islamist” measure is used instead of religious generally, it is similarly insignificant. 
Neither holding territory nor state sponsorship is associated with changes in attacks.  
Model 7 uses a considerably smaller sample, only 1997-2006. These years are used 
because the FTO list started in 1997. The larger sample is generally preferable, because 
many groups existed for years earlier than 1997, and truncating the sample drops a great 
deal of information about these groups. However, the post-1996 sample is interesting to 
evaluate as well. Most of the control variables in this model are statistically insignificant. 
The sample in Model 7 is substantially smaller than those examined in other models, so this 
could explain differences in results. 
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Model 8 uses an alternate dependent variable, the change in attacks in the entire 
country that the group primarily operates in, from one year to the next. This is helpful 
because many attacks are not attributed to particular groups, so the primary dependent 
variable could be undercounting group attacks. The country measure could also capture 
spillover effects of FTO status on other groups (Tominaga 2018), since militant 
organizations often train and attack together. Consistent with this, the interaction term is 
negatively signed and statistically significant.26     
Model 9 includes an alternate measure of FTO status. Instead of the dichotomous 
measure, this model uses a count indicating the number of years the group had been on the 
FTO list. This operationalization of FTO status is introduces important temporal variation 
into the measure. The variable is also interesting is because we might expect cumulative 
effects. Indeed, results are overall robust. The coefficient on the interaction term is about 
negative three. With each additional year of FTO status, for groups in U.S.-allied countries, 
a group is expected to carry out three fewer attacks. However, the component term FTOt-1 is 
positively signed and marginally statistically significant. This suggests that for groups that 
operate in states that are not U.S. allies (U.S. ally=0), another year on the FTO list is 
associated with a slight increase in terrorist attacks. This could be the result of some 
backlash effect, perhaps increased visibility due to FTO status, that groups are able to 
capitalize upon if they are in a country that is not cooperating with the United States on the 
implementation of its sanctions. Given that the result is only marginally significant and 
insignificant in other models, one should probably not infer too much from the positive 
coefficient.  
Finally, Model 10 uses an alternate measure of propensity to cooperate with the 
United States on counterterrorism issues: Efrat’s (2015) indicator of the presence of an FBI 
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office in the country. The main result, the interaction term, is robust with this different 
operationalization of U.S. security cooperation. 
Beyond the robustness checks shown in the table, many other modifications to the 
sample and variables return consistent results. In the Appendix, one model is a traditional 
OLS fixed-effects model, since the AR(1) models have fewer observations because the first 
observation (year) for each group is dropped. With this larger sample, results are robust. 
Another Appendix model uses an alternate dependent variable, changes in terrorist attack 
fatalities instead of simply attacks. Other models include additional independent variables, 
U.S. military aid to the group’s country and physical integrity rights in the group’s country. 
These variables are not included in the main models as they cause many observations to 
drop due to limited coverage. An additional test in the Appendix involves a measure of US 
allies that excludes NATO countries, to ensure that those states are not driving results. 
Findings are consistent in all these analyses. In sum, the results in Table 2 are robust to 
many changes in model specification. 
Regarding goodness of fit, models in Table 1 report Akaike Information Criterion 
and Bayesian Information Criterion values, where a lower score indicates a better model fit. 
These values suggest the models with the interaction term (Models 4 and 5) fit better than 
the simpler models in the table, in terms of both AIC and BIC. It is noteworthy that both 
estimators, especially the BIC, penalize for additional terms in the model. 
In the Appendix, predicted values are plotted against observed values and discussed. 
Some observations that were not predicted well by the model were those during years of 
massive increases in terrorism, such as Spain’s ETA in 2000, the FARC in 2002, or Sri 
Lanka’s Tamil Tigers in 2005. It can be difficult to account for such outliers, but future 
research could incorporate more fine-grained measures of state negotiation processes or 
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crackdowns, as these often precede spikes in terrorism. Some observations that the model 
did especially well with, relative to a model without the interaction term, were of FTOs in 
countries not aligned with the United States. The model without the interaction term was 
often worse in these situations, over-predicting decreases in violence. Overall, the model 
offers an improvement over models that do not consider the interaction of FTO status and 
alignment with the United States on counterterrorism.        
  
Conclusion 
 States increasingly impose sanctions against terrorist groups, but there has been 
little systematic analysis of whether these policies achieve intended effects. The results 
presented here suggest that sanctions of the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization list are 
associated with reduced terrorist attacks (by the group and in the country more generally), 
and fewer terrorism fatalities, over time – but only for groups located in countries aligned 
with the United States on security issues. The findings point to the importance of terrorism 
funding and organizational dynamics, and to international counterterrorism cooperation. 
Fighting terrorism is far more effective when countries cooperate. 
 Some shortcomings of the research should be acknowledged. First, a tradeoff with 
global analyses is that they cannot go into fine-grained detail about particular cases. 
Complementary work could examine specific militant groups in depth to see if the 
dynamics outlined here are observed as theorized. Related to this, qualitative work or new 
data-collection efforts could look at more detailed militant group attributes, such as group 
funding sources and internal group structure. Second, the analysis examined years through 
2006 due to data availability. This means that the quantitative tests studied 10 years of the 
existence of the FTO list, which is a substantial amount of time, and includes the important 
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early years of the “War on Terror.” However, significant events have happened in terrorism 
since 2006, such as the rise of ISIS. As a result, this analysis is an initial step, a study of the 
first decade of the FTO list. A next step would be to analyze more recent dynamics. 
 There are other avenues for future research to build on this study. Given the 
importance of international cooperation to counterterrorism, what other ways do 
international relationships contribute to strategies against terrorist organizations? Despite 
the benefits of international counterterrorism cooperation, there are impediments to 
cooperation, such as mistrust, in the case of intelligence sharing (Walsh, 2006). Under what 
conditions are states especially likely to overcome the obstacles to international 
counterterrorism cooperation? More broadly, how else do international relations affect 
terrorism? Some research has looked at international cooperation (Byman, 2006; Conrad 
and Walsh, 2014; Plumper and Neumayer, 2010), foreign aid (Lee, 2016), and international 
organizations (Pascoe 2016), but more work can be done to integrate explicitly 
international phenomena into the study of terrorism. 
Finally, how do analyses of counterterrorism policies speak to each other? Research 
in this category includes studies of airport metal detectors (Enders and Sandler, 1993), 
targeting leaders of militant groups (Johnston, 2012; Jordan, 2014), and deradicalization 
programs (Horgan and Braddock, 2010). What tactics have been the most effective? Some 
studies explicitly compare policies in a systematic way (Enders and Sandler, 1993), but this 
kind of research has been rare. The present manuscript looked at leadership removal in 
addition to FTO status, finding the latter to be more robustly associated with changes in 
terrorism. Future research should consider incorporating FTO status into analyses of 
counterterrorism policies. 
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Table 1. Groups on the Foreign Terrorist Organization List, 1997-2006 
Group Country Listed Removed 
Abu Nidal Organization Lebanon 1997 2017 
Abu Sayyaf Group Philippines 1997 -- 
Armed Islamic Group Algeria 1997 2010 
Aum Shinrikyo Japan 1997 -- 
Basque Fatherland and Liberty Spain 1997 -- 
DFLP-Hawatmeh Faction Israel 1997 1999 
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group - IG) Egypt 1997 -- 
HAMAS Israel 1997 -- 
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) Pakistan 1997 -- 
Hizballah Lebanon 1997 -- 
Japanese Red Army Japan 1997 2001 
Kahane Chai (Kach) Israel 1997 -- 
Khmer Rouge Cambodia 1997 1999 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, aka Kongra-Gel) Turkey 1997 -- 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) Sri Lanka 1997 -- 
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents Chile 1997 1999 
Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization Iran, France, Iraq 1997 2012 
National Liberation Army (ELN) Colombia 1997 -- 
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) Israel 1997 -- 
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Israel 1997 -- 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine  Israel 1997 -- 
PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) Lebanon 1997 -- 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Colombia 1997 -- 
Revolutionary Nuclei Greece 1997 2009 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November Greece 1997 2015 
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front  Turkey 1997 -- 
Shining Path (SL) Peru 1997 -- 
Tupac Amaru Revolution Movement Peru 1997 2001 
al-Qa’ida (AQ) Afghanistan, Pakistan 1999 -- 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Uzbekistan 2000 -- 
Real Irish Republican Army United Kingdom 2001 -- 
Jaish-e-Mohammed Pakistan 2001 -- 
Lashkar-e Tayyiba Pakistan 2001 -- 
United Self Defense Force of Colombia Colombia 2001 2014 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Israel 2002 -- 
Asbat al-Ansar Lebanon 2002 -- 
al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb Algeria 2002 -- 
Communist Party Philippines/New People’s Army Philippines 2002 -- 
Jemaah Islamiya Indonesia 2002 -- 
Lashkar i Jhangvi Pakistan 2003 -- 
Ansar al-Islam Iraq 2004 -- 
Continuity Irish Republican Army United Kingdom 2004 -- 
ISIL (formerly al-Qa’ida in Iraq) Iraq 2004 -- 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Libya 2004 2015 
Islamic Jihad Union Uzbekistan 2005 -- 
Moroccan Islamic Combat Group Morocco 2005 2013 
Source: U.S. State Department. Names are spelled as they are on State’s website, but some are 
abbreviated. Country refers to primary location. Some groups are shown with multiple countries 
because they changed their primary location over time.  
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Table 2. Fixed effects regressions of changes in terrorist groups’ attacks, 1970-2006. 
 Model 1 
controls 
only 
Model 2 
FTO 
Model 3 
US ally 
Model 4 
Main model 
Model 5 
Alternate 
US ally 
measure: 
U.S. alliance 
portfolio 
similarity 
FTOt-1  -6.728***  1.706 1.301 
  (1.513)  (2.066) (1.958) 
US ally   -1.198 .104 -3.209 
   (1.824) (1.861) (5.760) 
FTOt-1 x US     -17.320*** -32.207*** 
ally    (2.828) (4.884) 
Attacks t-1 -.343*** -.355*** -.343*** -.366*** -.370*** 
 (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) 
Group age -.036 .055 -.043 .024 .052 
 (.082) (.083) (.082) (.083) (.085) 
Age squared -.002* -.002** -.002* -.002* -.002* 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Decapitations t-1 -1.984* -1.643 -1.988* -1.810* -1.746* 
 (1.030) (1.030) (1.030) (1.026) (1.025) 
Country  10.11*** 9.518*** 10.25*** 11.106*** 12.11*** 
regime type (3.496) (3.512) (3.502) (3.516) (3.576) 
Country  .262 -.408 .518 .510 -1.693 
population (2.712) (2.583) (2.740) (2.542) (2.526) 
GDPPC -.115 -.145 -.112 -.127 -.073 
 (.147) (.147) (.147) (.147) (.152) 
Constant -1.922 4.882 -4.058 -5.262 17.96 
 (27.58) (26.08) (27.76) (25.51) (25.13) 
Group fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 
disturbances? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,376 
(groups) (390) (390) (390) (390) (347) 
AIC 37451.02 37438.01 37452.57 37402.39 37396.85 
BIC 37502.26 37495.66 37510.22 37472.84 37467.31 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * p <10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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Table 3. Additional specifications based on Model 4 
 Model 6 
No group 
fixed effects; 
time-
invariant 
controls 
Model 7 
Only 1997-
2006 
Model 8 
Alternate 
DV: 
Attacks in 
group's 
country  
Model 9 
Alternate 
FTO 
measure: 
Years on 
FTO list 
Model 10 
Alternate 
US ally 
measure: 
FBI office 
in country 
FTOt-1 1.418 -.610 -16.14 .709* .297 
 (1.161) (2.113) (12.515) (.394) (1.944) 
US ally 1.726*** 10.121 -23.30** .133 .779 
 (.525) (8.622) (11.50) (1.852) (1.095) 
FTOt-1 x US  -4.782*** -11.441*** -60.074*** -3.451*** -10.524*** 
ally (1.604) (3.218) (17.31) (0.555) (2.281) 
Attacks t-1 -.134*** -.921*** -.998*** -.366*** -.911*** 
 (.029) (.028) (.015) (.013) (.024) 
Group age -.069 .492* .705 -.012 .658*** 
 (.049) (.279) (.654) (.082) (.243) 
Age squared .001 -.003 -.005 -.002* -.013*** 
 (.000) (.005) (.010) (.001) (.004) 
Decapitations t-1 -1.113 -.842 -4.419 -2.094** -.521 
 (.776) (.615) (3.219) (1.027) (.649) 
Country  1.595 4.628 123.9*** 11.59*** 10.47 
regime type (1.854) (7.318) (23.65) (3.518) (6.446) 
Country  -.140 3.576 10.50*** .863 7.848** 
population (.128) (5.285) (2.652) (2.569) (3.467) 
GDPPC -.015 -.668 -6.622*** -.120 -.177 
 (.038) (.511) (1.036) (.147) (.446) 
UCDP rebel 1.595***     
Group (.557)     
Group size .888***     
 (.316)     
Religious  .049     
Group (.373)     
Holds  1.109     
Territory (.741)     
State- .246     
sponsored (.646)     
Constant .106 -43.092 -11.201 -8.980 -91.80*** 
 (1.360) (29.06) (8.776) (25.81) (22.35) 
Group fixed effects?  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances? No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,911 1,662 4,469 4,469 1,905 
(groups) (442) (274) (390) (390) (279) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. In Model 6, standard errors are clustered by 
terrorist group. * p <10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Figure 1. Graph of interaction results from Table 2, Model 4 
 
 
Figure 2. Graph of interaction results from Table 2, Model 5 
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Notes 
 
1 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
1 Some research looks at how sanctions against states affect terrorist groups (Bapat et al. 
2016). This is a different topic than sanctions against terrorist groups. 
3 The full list is available here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
4 Differences across group types are also argued to occur because idiosyncratic political 
factors play a role in the designation of terrorist groups in each country or entity (Beck and 
Miner 2013, Jarvis and Legrand 2018). This is discussed more below.  
5 The State Department defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” 
See Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f (d). A “terrorist group” is basically any 
subnational political organization that uses terrorism (Phillips 2015, 231). This is a broad 
notion of terrorist groups, but it is used by many scholars (e.g., Jones and Libicki 2008), 
and is consistent with the State Department’s understanding of the concept. For more on the 
concepts of terrorism and terrorist, and criticisms of the State Department’s terminology, 
see Tilly (2004).   
6 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. Italics in original. 
7 Interview with Jason Blazakis, Director of the Office of Counterterrorism Finance and 
Designations, Bureau of Counterterrorism, at the Department of State, Washington D.C., 
March 18, 2015. 
8 The six-step process to designate groups is described in a report by the Government 
Accountability Office (2015). 
9 Initially, designations lasted only two years, but this was soon increased to five years.  
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10 This is relevant from a research design perspective because it further suggests FTO status 
is not simply a function of group attacks. 
11 Terrorist groups also often cease to exist as organizations or stop using terrorism 
altogether, which is the subject of many studies (Carter, 2012; Jones and Libicki, 2008). 
However, relatively few of the FTOs no longer exist, so analysis of group failure as a 
possible result of designation is difficult due to little variation on the dependent variable. 
12 The Taliban was sanctioned via Executive Order, but is not on the FTO list. Otherwise, 
there are very few individuals or groups not already covered by the FTO list. Interview with 
a former U.S. Department of the Treasury official, Washington D.C., March 17, 2015. 
13 In 2012, a member of Egyptian FTO al Gama legally entered the United States for 
meetings in Washington. This caused a controversy regarding whether he received a waiver 
or if his admittance was a mistake (Reuters 2012). Regardless, the case shows that members 
of FTOs seek to enter the United States to lobby for their groups. The number of visa 
denials mentioned above suggests that most FTO “lobbyists” are not successful at legally 
entering. 
14 One means to reduce public concern is keeping cooperation, or at least negotiations, 
secret (Leventoglu and Tarar 2005). 
15 Shapiro and Siegel (2007) argue that a “critical threshold” of funding restrictions must be 
reached for them to be effective. Perhaps in the case of FTO sanctions, that threshold is 
only met when the United States can effectively partner with group’s country. 
16 Interview with Jason Blazakis, Director of the Office of Counterterrorism Finance and 
Designations, Bureau of Counterterrorism, at the Department of State, Washington D.C., 
March 18, 2015. 
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17 These years are based on the availability of the data. A robustness check is reported on 
the 1997-2006 sample, and primary results hold. However, using data further back in time 
is helpful because many of the groups started before 1997, so truncating the data loses 
important information on these groups. For example, it is interesting to analyze all of 
Hezbollah’s existence (as far back as 1982), to observe how the group changed with time, 
including when it went from being a non-FTO to an FTO. 
18 All groups on the FTO list during the years of the Jones and Libicki data are included in 
my data, even though some groups might not be immediately apparent. One issue is slight 
changes in names, such as the FTO Islamic Jihad Union, which is in Jones and Libicki as 
the Islamic Jihad Group. 
19 As noted, group longevity could be a dependent variable, but few FTOs have ceased to 
exist or given up terrorism, so there is insufficient variation for meaningful analysis. 
20 If a model is estimated where the dependent variable is FTO status, neither a group’s 
lagged attacks nor change in attacks are statistically significant, consistent with previous 
work (Beck and Milner 2013). This should reduce concerns about reverse causality.  
21 FTOs that are coded as operating primarily in a U.S. ally state, according to ATOP, 
during at least some years of the study are those in Chile, Colombia, Greece, Japan, 
Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, or Uzbekistan. 
22 I exclude non-aggression and neutrality pacts because they imply a lower level of 
security cooperation (Mattes and Vonnahme 2010). 
23 It is also weighted by the distance between countries, as well as the type of alliance.  
24 If the mean pre-2001 value is inputted for the post-2000 years, results are similar. 
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25 If the size variable is broken down into its size categories, the two largest categories are 
positively associated with attack changes, relative to the smallest category. 
26 If a variable is included measuring the number of terrorist groups in the country-year, it 
is statistically significant and positively signed. However, other results are substantively 
unchanged. If the variable is included in other models, it is never statistically significant. 
